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Forced migration and border spaces as fault lines posing risks to society through the notion of 
‘Othering’, remain under-explored in risk literature. With Europe facing its biggest 
humanitarian crisis with forced migration and displacement due to conflict zones, the borders 
of the European Union have received renewed attention in media. Refugees and the displaced 
are often depicted as ‘migrants’ and are seen as transgressing borders as illegitimate entities. 
Although increasing attention has been paid to border patrol and issues of securitization since 
9/11, the ‘migrant’ body as ‘risky body’ in political and policy discussions is under-
conceptualised and theorised in risk literature. We examine political discourses of the UK 
government to discern how the migrant and the expanding borders of the EU are framed as 
forms of societal and economic risk and equally how these are mitigated with and through the 
discourse of space and borders. We take a constructionist approach to the ‘migrant’ problem in 






Risk analysis has a blind spot. While spatial analysis has figured in the demarcation of risk in 
terms of environmental degradation, hazards and epidemiological outbreaks, there is a dearth 
of academic literature on how the border space constantly re-ignites renewed depictions of 
threat in the guise of the migrant, refugee or the illegitimate ‘Other’ in the area of risk studies. 
Many processes and phenomena implicate space as presenting new forms of cartographic 
reconfiguration as well as new forms of challenges for humanity over time. From colonisation, 
the emergence of the empire, the formation of new nation-states after World War II to the 
discourse of globalisation as well as the rise of the internet portending a ‘global village’, the 
concept of space has imposed different cartographies on human imagination and in our 
constructions of local and global risks. Throughout history, there have been counteracting 
tendencies to unify spaces and equally to uncouple spaces. Imperialism, colonisation, the rise 
of nationalism post-World War Two (and in tandem the declaration of independence and self-
rule), the Cold War, the truncation of Europe into East and West and the breaking of the Berlin 
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Wall or the formation of the European Union saw spaces being reclaimed and renamed, unified 
and splintered. 
 
With a highly-interconnected world, risks, crises and environmental concerns have affected us 
despite geographical distance. Today when flights go missing or crash, the impact of the loss 
and implications for security are globally shared. Globalisation with the development of 
convoluted supply and demand chains disseminates risk in much more intricate and complex 
ways (Beck 1999). It is no longer possible to draw a line around our geographical boundaries 
and stay secure within it. Unforeseen new risks ranging from terrorism, cyber-attacks, 
biochemical warfare to environmental decimation as envisaged through the ‘epoch of the 
anthropocene’, where man’s interactions with the earth invariably implicates both the drawing 
down of its resources and creation of new risks, mean space is constantly reconfigured, both in 
the remodelling of risks as well as in our sociological imagination of space, and equally what 
is seemingly ‘proximate’ or ‘distant’ in a world increasingly connected through new media 
technologies. 
 
Space is a recurring concept in risk literature but often it takes different paradigms in mitigating 
risk. A renewed emphasis of space emerged with 9/11 and the attacks on the Twin Towers, 
which again solidified an ideological divide between East and West in terms of values. The 
subsequent ‘war on terror’ by the West saw the rise of an age of anxiety where Western cities 
became the target of attacks. Against this backdrop, terrorism as a global phenomenon 
envisaged through exploding cities and crashing planes has made risk a pervasive issue. It re-
ignited the consciousness about space and anxieties about borders being permeable to new 
forms of risk. While terrorism remains one of the biggest risks for governments and nation-
states today, the conflict in the Middle East and Africa and other parts of the world are 
seemingly creating new threats through the ‘migrant’ or the refugee/asylum seeker. As 
terrorism reconfigured our notions of proximity and distance in terms of where attacks can 
happen, the border space acquired new political significance of being constantly transgressed 
through forced migration and displacement of peoples, re-invoking the ‘governmentality’ 
(Foucault 2007) of modern nation states. The violations by alien bodies are perceived as risk 
to the social, cultural and economic stability of states and hence the border is invoked and 
fortified through the wall, fence, razor wire, border patrol and forms of citizenship controls.   
 
Existing risk literature discusses the border space and migration in terms of securitization and 
terrorism (see Aradau & Van Munster 2007; Bigo 2014; Walklate & Mythen 2015), as a risk to 
ecosystems (see de Sherbinin et al. 2012) and even the association of contamination diseases 
with foreigners or immigrants (see Prothero 2001; Darlington et al. 2015). Discourses about 
space have as such reviewed the risks posed to the environment in the age of the anthropocene. 
In view of this, both migration and climate change are seen as top risks facing the global 
economy (Yang 2016). Though migration has been framed as generating risk/uncertainty in 
popular, political and policy discourses, Allan William and Vladmir Balaz (see 2012:167) assert 
that there is still a dearth of attention on this area in terms of risk literature, particularly a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of migrant ‘Other’ as threat in risk literature. They point 
out that ‘migration is both informed by risk and uncertainty, and generates risk and uncertainty, 
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whether for migrants, non-migrants in sending communities, or populations in the destination 
countries’ (2012: 167). They contend that migration is also perceived to generate risks for 
destination societies, linked to a process of highly racialised and ethnicised ‘Othering’ (2012: 
167). As such they argue that while migration research often emphasises the importance of risk 
there is often very little explicit theorization on the role of risk, revealing no single 
comprehensive theoretical framework for risk and uncertainty.   
 
This paper, while acknowledging the lack of a comprehensive theory in manufacturing risks 
about the Other in modernity, approaches the notion of risk and social production of categories 
with the nation-state through Foucault’s notion of governmentality. It takes a constructionist 
approach in analysing how government discourses construct risks through the so called 
‘migrant crises’ and the violation of the borders, and equally in the techniques it employs to 
mitigate risk for the UK and in its position within the EU from 2010 till 2016 (pre-Brexit) 
where spatial references dominate discursive risk construction. 
 
The State, Borders and ‘Governmentality’ 
 
Today what could come through your mailbox in the security of your home to what can be left 
unattended in a public place such as an airport entwines risk and space in complex ways. For 
Ulrich Beck the nature of risks is historically unprecedented in terms of their temporal and 
spatial reach. Beck (1986) contends in his book Risk Society, that in the past citizens expected 
their governments to deliver ‘goods’ whether this be better living conditions, consumer choices 
or living wage. In contrast today, citizens expect governments to protect them from the ‘bad’ 
ranging from the unknown to environmental and technological risks.  In postmodern 
consciousness, with the advance of science and technology posing new forms of 
biotechnological hazards from the nuclear age, there is a preoccupation with safety and security 
and a need to reduce and manage risks actively in society. Joffe (1999), writing from a social 
psychology perspective, argues that a personal invulnerability to risk is evoked by externalizing 
the perceived threat, effectively transposing it to others 
Despite an overriding discourse of global interconnectivity and reconfiguration of time and 
space through technologies, the border space has been renewed as a body politic of risk. Who 
is contained within and without produces social categories bound through legality and 
illegitimacy (see, Charteris-Black, 2006).  These social categories emerging through who we 
keep in and who we keep out produce risk typologies in coding those who violate borders. The 
transgression of the border as a boundary marker is seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the 
nation-states and its ability to safeguard borders. The production of the category of the ‘other’ 
is manufactured both through state structures and people’s culture of fear of the other i.e. taking 
away jobs, eating into the benefit system or morphologically not looking like the rest of the 
population (see Joffe, 1999). The dissolution of territorial boundaries and the flow of the alien 
other can engender a “fertile breeding ground for the development or intensification of 
xenophobic politics” (Dillon 1995: 355). 
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In drawing on Foucault’s theory of ‘governmentality’, the concept of population as an 
invention of the science of statistics offered governments a mechanism to specify and organise 
populations through the complementary modes of power and knowledge to institute a 
rationalising administration. For Foucault governmentality “subordinates law, custom, force, 
and ethics into the strategic and tactical' by which the population is ordered and delimited” 
(Dillon 1995: 329–330). Dillon (1995: 330), in his analytic of Foucault’s governmentality, 
points out that the concept itself does “not rely in law as juridical power but on philosophical 
and epistemological presuppositions which are institutionalised in knowledge practice through 
which subjects (and subjectivities) are born”. Governmentality as such did not only denote 
power regime nor its extension to all walks of life but also its ‘forceful delimitation of space in 
which it can operate’ (Dillon 1995: 333). As such ordering of populations entailed the 
configuring of rights and responsibilities, statistical coding of people and their domestication 
through technologies of government. Hence by-products of such cataloguing in today’s bio-
politics include the category of the migrant, the refugee and the asylum seeker. Borders have 
become a key locus for discipline and punishment, in tandem, complex modes of criminality 
have emerged in the modern nation-state (Bowling 2013) where these forms of criminality can 
be managed through risk categories and risk discourses. 
Risk construction and management in tandem with the rise of the nation state as a form of 
corporate power in modernity sought to take ‘everyday’ fears and threats and turn them into 
rationalist discourses and arenas which could be managed. Collective insecurity and fears of 
people became part of government’s risk management where discourse in public spheres and 
opinion polls provided a means to elicit public opinion. Invariably, people and their perceptions 
are intricately entwined in risk management and policy dimensions. The ordinary man as 
citizen or consumer is incorporated into risk management and policy making by eliciting their 
responses and converting responses into data which can be managed through elite formation 
and through ‘expert knowledge’. This includes affective and emotional responses to issues. The 
‘visceral public’ as such is constantly mediated through the rationalistic approaches of the 
expert. If the public construct risk through their lived experiences or false perceptions, the 
science of risk sought to uncouple the visceral from the issue under scrutiny and to transform 
much of it into a construct to be managed through the imperative of the policy makers. Part of 
this imperative is to transpose risk onto the ‘Other’ (see Joffe, 1999). The phenomenon of 
Othering and the social production of categories in society can be framed in rationalised 
discourse in terms of immigration, policy, enhancing border patrol and in social semantics 
which turn refugees into migrants where they are seen as opportunistic entities adding to the 
‘politics of depletion’ particularly in periods of economic downturn. In view of this, the spatial 
category of the border and the boundary become both productive and imaginative spaces to 
encode risk and uncertainty and the governmentality of the nation-state in modernity. 
Bosworth and Guild (2008: 703-704) assert that while permeable borders are a defining aspect 
of modernity due to global capitalism, mass tourism, the communications revolution and 
evolving forms of regional governance such as the European Union, most industrial, 
democratized nations have, like the United Kingdom, sought to restrict access to non-citizens. 
Bosworth and Guild, in evoking Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of ‘liquid modernity’, ascribe it as 
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a period of fluid and shifting boundaries, borders and identities, when, just as the barriers to 
capital, goods and information have eased, the movement of people has been subject to 
increasing scrutiny and, for the most vulnerable among them, has been all but (legally) curtailed 
(Bauman 2004; 2007). Asylum seekers and unskilled workers are presented as a drain on public 
services and a threat to local wages, social cohesion and national culture. Since the Twin 
Towers attack in 2001 and London Underground bombings in 2005 such fears have become 
“more diffuse where unconnected migrant groups are linked by a single discourse on border 
control that spills over into the governance of all non-citizens and beyond” (Bosworth and 
Guild 2008: 705). 
 
Invariably, the state plays a significant role in risk management in modernity. However, 
governments are just one actor in this process and, as Foucault argues, power is distributed 
across society – in the media, in NGOs, and in local community groups amongst others. They 
all play roles in defining the risks associated with migrants, or in categorising ‘risky migrants’, 
and thereby simultaneously defining, producing and depleting these risks. Beck (1986) 
positions the mass media as playing a crucial role in processes of risk revelation by casting a 
‘spotlight’ on them (see Cottle 1998: 5). As such Beck’s conception of the ‘relations of 
definition’ premises on how risks can be socially manufactured in public discourses.  “Relations 
of definitions include the rules, institutions and capacities that structure the identification and 
assessment of risks; they are the legal, epistemological and cultural matrix in which risk politics 
is conducted” (cf. Cottle 1998: 7). Risk production as such is often iterative. In the case of the 
‘risky migrant’ it veers between the public’s culture of fear of the Other to the government’s 
forms of control over populations and their management.   
 
Threats and fears that emerge from the public, and these perceptions which can pose renewed 
risks to societies through the emergence of conflict or disaffect on the ground, need more 
scrutiny in terms of whether there is a ‘lack’ in the risk arena in failing to understand people as 
anthropological objects and subjects. One main area where such an approach would be 
invaluable is the issue of immigration where the fear of the other can defy a ‘scientific and 
rationalist’ management. The anthropological turn in risk literature is necessary and vital to 
identify risks which emerge through peoples’ constructions of risk or their perceptions of the 
Other. Human configurations of space and its emotional co-location with both belonging and 
casting out of the Other become significant elements in both risk communication and policy 
dimensions with regard to immigration. 
 
The EU, UK and the Border Space 
 
The notions of space and borders have been recurring themes since the inception of the 
European Community which preceded the European Union where the overriding imperative 
has been to facilitate movement and mobility for the mutual benefit of member states. The 
founding principle articulated in the Treaty of Rome (1957) is the free movement of capital, 
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goods, services and persons between member states. It was the economic rationale that 
persuaded Britain to join the European Community in 1973 amidst a perceived risk that the 
demise of the Empire lead to a loss of markets and marginalization in a globalising world. From 
the outset of membership, a strong Eurosceptic tradition of thought hostile to closer ties to 
Europe has remained (Wall 2012). Federalist inclinations are seen as a threat to British 
sovereignty particularly in view of a British identity rooted in the notion of the ‘spatial 
separation of an island, psychologically distant from the European integration movement’ and of 
a historical and racial distinctiveness (Daddow 2013:212–213). 
This Euroscepticism and perception of being exceptional was given added impetus when the 
Maastricht Treaty (1991) turned the Community into a Union (i.e. from a predominantly trading 
block to a more political entity with looser internal borders). In the same year, France and the 
UK reached an agreement to place juxtaposed controls,1 i.e. immigration checks, at designated 
cross Channel sites, including at Coquelles near Calais. These controls mean checks take place 
before boarding a train or ferry rather than on arrival.  In 1994, the Channel Tunnel linking 
Britain to the continent opened and a year later the Schengen Agreement was signed allowing 
for the removal of internal borders between signatory states with the purpose of further 
facilitating the efficient movement of people, etc. Britain opted out of Schengen, choosing to 
retain entry and exit controls of its own borders, on the grounds that it wanted to cede neither 
sovereignty nor security to another entity. Thus, the external border to Schengen and Britain’s 
border with the continent became Europe’s seaboard with the Channel. 
In 1999 the agency Frontex was created to advise and support those countries whose own 
borders formed the external boundaries for the EU as a whole. In tandem, the ‘Risk Analysis’ 
unit was established to capture and interpret data on global trends that affect border security 
including cross-border crimes such as human trafficking and irregular migration (Frontext 
u.d.).  However, the border of the EU has not been rigid, shifting outwards through six waves 
of enlargement. In 1973, it moved westward with the inclusion of the UK and Ireland, in the 
1980s it pushed southward to the Mediterranean to Greece, in the 1990s northward to 
encompass some of Scandinavia and eastward after the new millennium to include Hungary 
and Croatia, bringing the total number of member states to 28. Membership also brought access 
to new markets and to mobility of labour. 
Two major migration narratives have dominated British public debate since the 1990s; loss of 
control over borders and the economic threat of migration through expansion of membership.  
Enlargement to include the Polish in 2004 and the Bulgarians and Romanians in 2007 were 
                                                          
1
Juxtaposed controls refer to an agreement between Belgium France and the UK whereby immigration checks on certain cross-Channel 
places take place before boarding a train or ferry rather than on arrival after disembarking. The 1991 Sangatte Protocol between France and 
UK provided for border checkpoints to be set up by France in Cheriton, Kent, and by the UK at Coquelles in France. Juxtaposed controls 
mean that when travelling from France via Eurotunnel, travellers have to clear both French exit checks and UK immigration and customs 
checks in Coquelles before boarding the train. Juxtaposed controls for Eurostar and ferry only consist of immigration pre-embarkation 
checks, while juxtaposed controls for Eurotunnel consist of both immigration and customs pre-embarkation checks. When travelling from 
the UK to Belgium or France by Eurostar, immigration entry checks into the Schengen Area take place before boarding the train in the UK 
rather than when arriving; carried out in UK stations before embarkation by French Border Police which also checks those passengers 
travelling to Belgium. When travelling from Belgium or France to the UK by Eurostar, passengers clear immigration exit checks from the 
Schengen Area as well as UK immigration entry checks before boarding the train. 
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accompanied by media scare stories warning of an impending ‘invasion’ (Ibrahim & Howarth 
2016a; Light & Young 2009; Ibrahim & Howarth 2016b) as well as questions about the notion 
of ‘Europe’ and about who has the right to speak about ‘what Europe is and should be’ (Feakins 
& Białasiewicz 2006: 658). Public, media and some political perceptions have centred on the 
economic threats of what are seen to be ‘waves’ of Eastern European ‘migrants’ coming to take 
‘our’ jobs and act as a drain on services including health and education (see Dennison & 
Goodwin 2015), igniting deep-seated fears about the loss of sovereignty and identity (Darian-
Smith 1999; Sellar et al. 2009). 
In addition, the UK’s border politics have been shaped by irregular migration. Post-World War 
Two international agreements sought to protect civilians fleeing persecution by defining who 
is a refugee and therefore entitled to seek sanctuary and avoid penalties for illegal entry in 
search of this. In Europe, dominant discourses of rights were disrupted, first, by the political 
upheaval that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc and the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The massive displacement that ensued from the geopolitical conflict 
was accompanied by a shift particularly in Europe in the dominant discourse away from rights, 
protection and sanctuary to one of the threats posed by 'unregulated, unaccountable population 
shifts' to the political stability and cohesion of the states (Bosworth 2008a: 201; Dillon 1995). 
From the late 1990s there has also been growing concern about people trafficking and 
smuggling and, after 9/11, about the possibility of terrorists infiltrating the asylum seeker-
migrant routes. Internationally, there has been a shift from the discourses of protection and 
rights to discourses of threat and risk depending on the perceived scale of migration and on 
whether the migrant is labelled a refugee, trafficker or terrorist (Howarth & Ibrahim 2012). The 
privileging of security and border control in policy responses to migration is a retreat from 
discourses of according protection and rights to refugees which emerged after the Second 
World War in international agreements on how civilians should be treated in conflict; 
particularly the right to seek sanctuary, to claim asylum and avoid penalties for illegal entry in 
search of these (see Fekete 2005). 
The massive flows of irregular migration in the EU following the Balkans conflagration in the 
late 1990s were a precursor of what was to come two decades later. Political instability around 
the world escalated such that in 2014 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned that 
world was facing its biggest ‘forced migration crisis’ since the Second World War (Gower & 
Smith 2015). Millions of people, half of whom were children, had been uprooted by conflict 
or persecution, stranded on the edges of society as long-term internally displaced or as refugees. 
The scale of displacement has required more co-ordination between states than before 
(UNHCR 2015b; UNHCR 2015a; Ibrahim & Howarth 2015). Ongoing instability across its 
borders with the Middle East and North Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan 
have contributed to Europe’s ‘migrant crisis’ reaching a crescendo in 2015. The crisis had been 
building since the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, but in 2015 Frontex estimated that twice as many 
asylum seekers and migrants (859,000 people) had arrived on Greek and Italian shores in the 
first 11 months of the year than in the previous five years combined, culminating to 4,000 
arrivals a day at one point in the Greek islands with 3695 dead or missing while crossing the 
Mediterranean in 2015 (cited in Papademetriou, 2015). 
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Frontex has identified three main routes into the EU. The Central Mediterranean route (Italy 
and Malta) is the most dangerous route with most travelling on smugglers' boats from Libya, 
Tunisia and Egypt (Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke 2015). The second route is the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route (Greece/Aegean Sea) which became the primary maritime route in 2015 
with in excess of 350,000 crossing from Turkey to Greece (mainly to Lesbos and Kos near the 
Turkish coast). The third route is through the Western Balkans where more than 155,000 have 
crossed from Serbia into Hungary. 
As the ‘sense of chaos’ at Europe’s borders escalated, the migration and humanitarian crisis 
‘tested’ European consensus and governance, creating a ‘crisis of solidarity’ as internal 
divisions deepened within the EU over who was responsible for dealing with the need 
(Papademetriou 2015). The unprecedented scale of the current migrant crisis and the initially 
slow, ad hoc response from EU member states has posed an ‘existential crisis’ for European 
institutions and Schengen (Papademetriou 2015). The scale of the crisis had ‘re-ignited deep 
internal divisions’ between the traditional ‘frontline’ states such as Greece and Italy as well as 
new ‘frontline’ states which had emerged in transit countries such as Croatia and Hungary 
(Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke 2015). 
While Britain has contributed to the militarization of the EU’s external borders e.g. by 
providing ships in the Mediterranean, the political pre-occupation has been with the movement 
of migrants and refugees into Calais where the country’s external borders lie. The 20-mile 
stretch between Calais and Dover is the narrowest point in the English Channel between Great 
Britain and the European mainland. Calais-Dover has practical significance as a major route in 
and out of Britain for people and goods (Readman 2014). With the opening of the Channel 
Tunnel in 1994 Calais became the major transit hub with migrants congregating there in the 
hope that they could hide on trucks heading across to Britain and so breakthrough border 
controls. The imposing of juxtaposed controls has made it harder to move on so Calais is thus 
variously represented as a 'bottleneck, barrier, border and breakthrough point' (Oxford 
Migration Observatory 2014). 
In terms of EU migration and asylum policies, Britain was neither ”wholly in or wholly out”, 
signing up to a little over half of the measures introduced by the EU such that engagement was 
“conditional and differential” (Geddes 2005: 732) with a particular emphasis on security and 
border controls at the external frontiers of Britain. In July 2002, UK and France agreed to close 
Sangatte refugee camp because it was seen as attracting migrants and a source of conflict 
between groups of them. After the closure of Sangatte, asylum seekers and migrants in Calais 
became relatively low profile. However, growing numbers fleeing Iraq, Somalia and 
Afghanistan set up informal camps known as ‘the jungle’ which attracted media attention in 
2009, as did the demolition of the camps. The Calais crisis came back into media scrutiny due 
to bigger events in the Mediterranean, where unprecedented numbers of refugees were risking 
their lives in overcrowded and rickety boats. On 2 September 2015 the tragic image of Aylan 
Kurdi dead on the beach ignited further interest in the Calais crisis, which saw a surge in photo 
coverage of both the Mediterranean and Calais crisis. Hence the forced migration in Syria and 
parts of Africa converged with anxieties about opening up the UK to new members such as 
Romania and Bulgaria between 2010 and 2016. 
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Methodology: Why the Constructionist Approach? 
 
Having set out the context of the so-called ‘migrant crises’ in the UK between 2010-2016 (i.e. 
since the advent of a Conservative-led government), we move on to outline how the political 
speeches and announcements are part of the elite formations responsible for the complementary 
power/knowledge binary which form the basis of governmentality of nation-states in 
modernity. In assessing the construction of risk through political discourses about migrants in 
the UK we take a constructionist approach. Tulloch and Lupton (2003: 1) contend that risk 
knowledge can be historical and locally mediated and tend to be constantly contested and often 
a subject of dispute.  The SARF model (or the Social Amplification of Risk Model) of 
Kasperson et al. (1988) contends that social and institutional actors, factors and contexts 
amplify or attenuate risk messages as they pass through society, ultimately influencing risk 
perception. Although SARF has mainly been used to analyse health, environmental and food 
risks it is highly malleable and able to be adapted to any type of risk (see Pidgeon et al. 2003). 
The proponents of SARF argue it is not a model per se but a broad framework capable of 
accommodating realist or constructionist approaches, the latter of which contends that risks 
exist in knowledge as social constructs which emerge through the collective generation of 
meaning through discourse (Schwandt 1994: 127). Constructionist approaches assume risk or 
risk discourses are endemic in late modernity. Furthermore, a risk is not only a response to 
objective reality but is transformed and mediated through processes of communication (see 
Douglas & Wildavsky 1983) or is socially constructed, brought into being and managed as part 
of social power (see Beck 1986). Sociological–constructionist approaches, in particular Irwin’s 
soft constructionism, do not deny the reality of problems but argue that ‘both real and imaginary 
… [ones] need to be socially constructed if they are to find a place on the … [political] agenda’ 
(Irwin 2001: 21–22). In essence a constructionist approach enables links to be made between 
discourse and perceptions as well as the social and institutional context in which risks may be 
constructed and managed. 
 
 As such we undertook a discourse analysis of the government statements, speeches and debates 
to delineate the social construction of risk at the border and equally its mitigation. In employing 
a constructionist approach we sought to discern the dominant discourses, mainly through 
patterns whether these be repetitions or the use of selective salient terminologies (i.e. such as 
‘exceptionalism’) to encode their ideological and social constructions of what might constitute 
risk. The discourse analysis as such was mined by identifying recurring themes of threats and 
equally discursive justifications to ward off these threats particularly in asserting the national 
sovereignty within Fortress Europe. The themes were then read and re-read to discern their link 
to context i.e. how context shaped discourse and how discourse shaped context. The discourse 
analysis that followed revealed both the rhetorical construction of the border space and its 
incumbent threats and at a metal-level it showcased the ideological negotiation of risks in 
rhetoric and statements.  
 
We analysed the construction of the ‘migrant’ as risk in political discourses between 2010 and 
2016, particularly in the context of the migrant/refugee camps in Calais and the increased 
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forced migration in the Mediterranean. It needs to be pointed out here that while the terms 
‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ were political and legally separate and distinct, the recurring references 
to both these terms tended to conflate them as one entity in many of announcements and 
speeches particularly with reference to Calais where it was deemed as more difficult to 
delineate the refugee from the opportunistic migrant. By 2015 and 2016 discourses of refugees 
while dominant with Cameron and May, were mainly in reference to the crises in the 
Mediterranean. It is notable that the term refugee remained reserved in British political 
discourse for Syrians in camps outside the EU (see Cameron, 2012, 2015b, 2016b; Cameron & 
Orban, 2016; May, 2012). Discourses of ‘migrant’ or ‘illegal migrant’ were reserved for other 
nationalities i.e. Eritreans, Somalians, Iraqis and Afghans and those who had transgressed the 
borders and were moving across Europe illegally. However, in the Mediterranean and Calais 
the two terms coalesced and enactments pointed to the difficulties in identifying refugees from 
the migrant or in tracing their origins of migration. UNHCR has repeatedly contested this 
spatial and ethnic delineation of refugee and migrant in British political discourses repeatedly 
arguing that the overwhelming majority of those crossing the Mediterranean were fleeing 
conflict and persecution and should in tandem be considered refugees. British political 
discourse continued to use the term ‘migrant’ to refer to those in Calais and the generic ‘people’ 
for those crossing the Mediterranean. The lack of delineation between migrant and refugee 
became a deliberate discursive device in coding the bodies as a form of risk and as suspect 
entities.   
We mined 261 announcements (i.e. press releases, speeches and statements) between 2010 and 
June 2016 from the gov.uk website. Relevant items were identified by selecting the 
‘immigration and border’ policy area on the website and ‘all departments’. A subsequent search 
was done on ‘refugee OR migrant OR Calais OR Mediterranean’ (see table 1 for a distribution 
of documents over time). A narrower search was undertaken on ‘Calais’ and on the 
‘Mediterranean’, the two spaces of crisis that our preliminary readings suggested British 
politicians had been primarily concerned with. We did a preliminary analysis of the emphasis 
in the headlines of announcements to obtain an overview of possible recurring discourses and 
shifts (or continuities) over time and what emerged were two distinctive periods. The pre-crisis 
period between 2010 and 2014 had fewer announcements (see table 1), most of those that were 
made were by junior ministers or anonymised departments (Green, 2010; Home Office, 2010a; 
Home Office and Border Force, 2013) and tended to focus on individual ‘stowaways’ 
apprehended before they could breach Britain’s controls. These often conveyed a sense of 
rational and effective management of the borders. As such, discourses between 2010 and 2014 
were dominated by relatively routine border management matters where risk was constructed 
as implicit or latent and the body of the migrant/refugee as contained and containable.  
Table 1: Government announcements on immigration and borders  
 *2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 *2016 TOTAL 
CALAIS 7 2 0 3 2 6 4 24 
MEDITERRANEAN 2 0 0 0 1 20 13 36 
REFUGEES OR MIGRANTS 
OR CALAIS OR 
MEDITERRANEAN 
39 35 23 44 37 49 34 261 
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* 2010 is a truncated year from May to December because of the general election and 2016 is truncated from January to June 
because of the timing of this research. 
However, between 2015 and 2016 there was marked changes both in the quantitative and 
qualitative intensification in discourses about borders and risky bodies (see Table 1) and in the 
greater prominence of Prime Minister David Cameron and Home Secretary in shaping British 
political discourse on the migration/refugee crisis. There was also more emphasis on inter-
governmental engagement, bilateral talks and militarization, a reflection of the Europe-wide 
crisis. Furthermore, the constructions of the migrant/refugee body shift from the individual to 
the collective where the weight of numbers exerting pressure on the borders is presented as 
posing a risk of multiple breaches on the British border in Calais and on the EU border. The 
perceived expansion of risk was accompanied by a widening of collaboration beyond the 
historic British-French ones over Calais to the inter-governmental ones with heads of state on 
the borders of the EU, both inside and outside. That is, the perception as to the ability to contain 
the crisis on Britain’s borders in Calais was constructed as contingent on addressing the flows 
of migrants/refugees from beyond the EU. In view of the intensification of discourses about 
the borders and risk between 2015 and 2016, we augmented the data with a search on Hansard 
on David Cameron/Theresa May, the two main government figures involved in the crises in 
addition to the original search terms of ‘refugee OR migrant OR Calais OR Mediterranean’. 
This elicited 13 relevant debates in 2015 and 8 in the first half of 2016.  
The period between 2015-2016  as such yielded more discourses compared to 2010-2014 
comprising the pre-crisis period. The two periods provided a contrast between periods of 
routine border management as opposed to periods of crisis. The pre-crisis years also contained 
constructions of latent risk that presaged what was to come. Prior to 2012, the term ‘refugee’ 
was rarely used in connection with Europe and mainly by junior ministers in connection with 
asylum seekers (see Green, 2011). Statements in 2012 by Cameron and May marked the 
beginning of a shift (Cameron, 2012; May, 2012). In 2014, the government under public and 
media pressure for not doing enough to address the growing humanitarian crisis, launched a 
programme aimed at taking ‘vulnerable’ Syrian ‘refugees’ from UN camps in North Africa 
(Brokenshire, 2014) and in 2015, within weeks after the image of Aylan Kurdi went viral the 
Ministerial Committee for Syrian Refugees was set up and special post of Minister for Syrian 
Refugees was created in the Home Office (Cameron & May, 2015). The purpose of analysing 
political discourses of ‘migrants’ over six years and in particular its intensification between 
2015 and 2016 was to derive an overview of discourses of risk as emanating from outside the 
EU. The main discourses which we identify in our analysis as such emerge from the data mined 
in this crucial crisis period between 2015 and 2016.  
Our analysis focused on how the border space ignites renewed forms of threat in the guise of 
the migrant. Recurring themes emerged in the readings and against the political and economic 
contextualisation of the EU and the UK. The dominant discourses included the border as a 
space of infiltration, breaches of patrol and of security or militarization. Equally these themes 
interwove other related discourses including ascribing criminality to the migrant and threats to 
our sense of nationhood, often mitigated through the notion of exceptionalism.  Our review of 
political rhetoric on risk and migration into the EU situates migration as posing multi-faceted 
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and interweaving risks, as such the resonant themes and the utilisation of distinct discourses - 
were not stand alone categories and were often inter-related. The announcements and elite 
political discourses were analysed against the political context of the EU and UK where the 
expanding space of the EU is counter-imagined against the bounded nation-state of UK.  
 
Analysis and Discussion  
 Our analysis of government discourses and announcements revealed that the issues of borders 
enacted constructions of risk at different levels particularly ensconced through the cartography 
of the EU, juxtaposed against the nation space of the UK. Hence, the risk construction and 
mitigation were dialectical; on the one hand, risk was constructed through the migrant issue 
and equally the government would offer mitigation to the risk to rationalise it through policies, 
securitization and militarization initiatives and through statistical measures, as well as 
underscoring how they departed from the majority of EU member states and hence were ahead 
of the game.  
The key shift between pre-crisis (2010 and 2014) and crisis periods (2015 and 2016) was in the 
more prominent role played by Cameron and May in shaping British political discourse on the 
migration/refugee crisis. Furthermore, the constructions of the migrant/refugee body shift from 
the individual to the collective where the weight of numbers exerting pressure on the borders 
is presented as posing a risk of multiple breaches on the British border in Calais and on the EU 
border. The perceived expansion of risk was accompanied by a widening of collaboration 
beyond the historic British-French ones over Calais to the inter-governmental ones with heads 
of state on the borders of the EU, both inside and outside. The main discourses emerging from 
the analysis are as below; 
1. Notion of Exceptionalism 
While the expansion of the borders of the EU is seen as a threat, the mitigation of the risk was 
often presented as the UK being in a position to carve out a position of ‘exceptionalism’. 
Britain’s membership of the EU had conferred on its citizens the right to ‘travel freely’ but it 
also conferred a reciprocal right on those of and in other member states to do likewise. One of 
the most contentious and emotive issues during the Brexit referendum debates was whether the 
price paid for Britons’ freedom of movement had been a loss of control over immigration, 
posing a threat to its sovereignty, hence the slogan ‘take back control of our borders’ which 
became part of the discourse of Brexit supporters (Somerville 2016; O’Connor & Vina 2016).  
The ‘Remain’ camp cited the stance of exceptionalism as providing the means to exert a degree 
of control over the borders within the EU union (i.e. the ability of British citizens to travel 
freely while the government retained the mechanisms to control entry of EU and non-EU 
citizens through border checks). 
David Cameron and Theresa May, both of whom positioned themselves within the ‘Remain’ 
camp, employed this rhetoric of ‘exceptionalism’ and the exercising of sovereignty particularly 
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in relation to the British opt-out from the Schengen agreement2 and its retaining of border 
controls when others had “taken theirs down” (Cameron 2015e). The retention of the right to 
deny entry and the exercising of responsibility in retaining checkpoints were key technologies 
of control in maintaining ‘hard borders’ (Cameron 2016b). British political discourses 
presented the signatories of Schengen as having forfeited these controls and as a consequence 
were struggling to manage an unprecedented movement of people as 1 million refugees and 
displaced persons crossed the Mediterranean in 2015, a four-fold increase on the year before 
(UNHCR 2016). Movement on this scale was seen as having exposed the vulnerabilities 
created by Schengen and some, for instance Germany, had been forced to resort to extreme 
measures of temporarily closing their borders in a bid to reassert sovereign control over moving 
bodies and mitigate the risk overwhelming numbers posed to the polity. British exceptionalism 
in opting out of Schengen could therefore be presented as rational in itself as well as facilitating 
the rational administration of risk. Exceptionalism allied to the ‘natural advantages’ of being 
an island meant that the UK was ‘less directly affected’ than other European countries by the 
refugee crisis (Cameron 2015h). In contrast, as the crisis mounted the Schengen countries were 
seen as belatedly mounting a rear-guard action and trying to put in place ‘a pale imitation of 
what we already have’ (Cameron 2016a). 
The 2015 migration crisis, in British political discourse, had drawn attention to a critical fault-
line encapsulated in Schengen. In removing internal borders, the Schengen nations had become 
dependent on the effective management of external borders by the EU’s ‘frontline’ states and 
Frontex. However, Cameron presented the external borders of Fortress Europe as permeable 
and the management of them irresolute. The rhetoric of Britain’s ‘hard’ borders stood in 
contrast to the EU’s ‘soft’ ones on the Mediterranean and tougher measures in Calais against 
the need for the EU to “prove” that it has an external border (Cameron 2015c). The tightening 
of British-French juxtaposed controls at Coquelles was contrasted with the need for a ‘more 
determined’ response elsewhere in Europe. The forfeiting of the techniques of control with 
Schengen and the absence of a decisive alternative meant that some member states had 
themselves become a risk entity and the freedom of movement across the EU necessitated a 
tougher stance in the management of Britain’s external borders in Calais. Border controls 
became symptomatic of Britain’s differentiated and conditional approach. Well managed 
controls were presented as one of the key mechanisms for letting ‘legitimate’ people and goods 
to pass through while ‘reducing threats’ of illegal immigration, smuggling and terrorism 
through Britain’s second line of defence at its ‘frontline’ in Calais (May 2011; May 2015a). 
Government discourses also sought to portray the UK as being ahead of the issues in facing 
21st century forced migration. Although Cameron distanced himself from “responsibility” for 
the management of the EU’s external borders, he was willing to dispatch British experts and 
border technologies to Europe’s “hotspots” while continuing to make the government priority 
“properly” policing its own external border at Calais (Cameron 2015c). The retention of the 
                                                          
2The Schengen agreement allows for states to temporarily re-introduce border controls, but generally this has 
been used in the aftermath of a terrorist attack and 2015-6 was the first time this had been done in response 
to irregular migration. The first to do so were Germany and Austria in September 2015, followed by Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden for between 4-8 months. Belgium, Hungary and Slovenia did so for shorter periods. 
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technologies of government in the form of off-shore border controls in France meant Britain 
was better equipped to detect and deter moving bodies that posed a risk before they landed in 
Britain. The rhetoric of juxtaposed controls3 at Calais and investment in tighter security there 
as well as the use of the latest technologies intended to detect moving bodies served to 
underscore a resolute response to shoring up Britain’s external defences (Cameron 2015h).  In 
frequently asserting that Britain’s external border lay in Calais and not with the Schengen states 
on the Mediterranean, Cameron not only differentiated the limits of his responsibility but also 
distanced his government from the apparent failures and loss of control on the EU’s external 
border. More was needed from the EU to “regain control” of its external borders and “contain 
migration flows” (Home Office, 2016). The need to retain or reassert control of the borders 
was a recurrent narrative in our analysis but often it was denoted through Europe’s inability to 
contain it in a more concerted manner.   
II. Transference of Risk and Responsibility to the Migrant Body 
As the deaths from drowning in the Mediterranean mounted, ministers faced a conundrum. 
They risked compromising Britain’s reputation as a humanitarian nation if the government held 
to its policy of refusing entry to refugees already in the EU. Or if they accepted the European 
Commission’s proposal of a quota they risked diluting their policy on “hard” borders and, to 
Cameron’s mind, legitimizing illegal methods of entry and breaches of controls. Discursively, 
the government managed the conflicting discourses by transferring risk and responsibility to 
the migrant body while seeming sympathetic about the tragedies unfolding in the 
Mediterranean. On the one hand, the migrant body was presented as desperate, preyed upon by 
those intent on profiteering from a “vile trade in human beings” (May 2015c) yet deluded in 
buying “false promises” by people traffickers who then loaded migrants “dangerous vessels … 
sending them – in many cases – to their deaths” (May 2015a). On the other hand, government 
rhetoric constructed the migrant body as complicit in its own risk, colluding with smugglers in 
cross-border crime, reckless and irresponsible in choosing to “risk their lives” and those of 
their families in making the treacherous journey to Europe (May 2015b). Responsibility for the 
“huge” risks taken and the consequences thereof were transferred to the migrant body rather 
than the British body politic. 
In these circumstances, according to Cameron and May, the response of a moral government 
was not to legitimize such actions by accepting refugees from among those that had already 
made the treacherous journey. Nor would ministers incentivize further risks to the migrant body 
by others who might seek to cross or those that profit from the trade in human traffic (May 
2015b). Instead, they set out a strategy which they claimed meant Britain would act rationally 
and affectively, with its “head” and its “heart” providing help for those in need while working 
“long term solutions” to the crisis (Cameron 2015h; Cameron 2015f). One manifestation of the 
strategy was the deployment of Royal Navy vessels to the Mediterranean as part of a 
humanitarian “search and rescue” for bodies at risk but also to “bust the business model of the 
                                                          
3Juxtaposed controls are where French exit and British entry checks take place before a person boards a train 
or ferry at Coquelles at the port of Calais rather than when disembarking in London (Cameron 2015d). This was 
seen as “a good thing for our country” (Cameron 2015d) 
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smugglers” and “break the link between getting in a boat and getting settlement in Europe” 
(Cameron 2016c). The humanitarian and security discourses rather than antithetical became 
mutually reinforcing around the rational and affective management of the risky body. 
The risky body was not only those that put their own lives and those of their families in danger, 
but also those that set out to endanger European lives. Speculation circulated in the media and 
parliament, particularly at the time of the Paris and Brussels attacks, that ISIS fighters may 
have infiltrated the refugee trails and already entered Europe. Offering refuge in Britain to 
those already in the EU presented a risk of its hospitality being abused if potential terrorists 
were allowed into the country, while agreeing to take 20,000 Syrian refugees vetted by the UN 
and the Home Office in the UN camps around Syria could be presented as Britain’s 
compassionate response to the humanitarian crisis and a rational one that safeguarded security. 
The double screening of refugees in the camps of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey meant tougher 
controls to weed out the deviant migrants. It was also a technique of control and mitigation by 
cataloguing those who could be reclassified as refugees and demarcating others as ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’ or with potential links to terrorist groups. The need for additional screening 
even before they got to Fortress Europe was underscored by the Paris attacks yet also cast the 
‘migrant’ as a suspect category until it had been determined that they were “genuinely fleeing 
persecution” and this being affirmed prior to entry meant they would not “pose a risk to our 
country” (Cameron 2015e).   
While pursuing a hard line against the refugee crisis in advocating relief from a distance and 
in refusing to accept its quota of refugees, the government sought to protect its public image 
on the global stage and invoking its historic image of providing refuge to those fleeing 
persecution. The government claimed it was upholding the tradition and moral responsibility 
to help refugees as “we have done throughout our history” (Cameron 2015f) by offering 
sanctuary to those who had been driven from their homes and taken refuge in neighbouring 
states (Cameron 2015a). In contrast, the difficulty of vetting and differentiating the ‘genuine’ 
refugee from the illegal migrant and the potential terrorist amongst those already in the EU 
meant knowledge of them was incomplete and all were cast as suspect, particularly at the 
juxtaposed controls in Calais where British exceptionalism empowered the government to 
exercise “full control” over who enters the UK (Cameron 2016a). Such controls were presented 
as non-discriminatory in so far as they applied “to all including EU citizens” (Cameron 2016a). 
The migrant risk was also often mitigated through statistical data by revealing how many 
people had been refused entry cited as evidence of rational and orderly control of population 
movements. For instance, Cameron claimed that since 2010, Britain had “refused entry” to 
95,000 people of whom 6,000 were EU nationals and more than half were stopped at juxtaposed 
borders in Calais primarily because of “national security concerns” (HC 2015b). 
 
The sensitivity of accusations that Britain was retreating from its humanitarian traditions, the 
proximity of the refugee/migrant crisis in Calais and the Mediterranean and the constant threats 
to the violation of the borders, prompted the UK to adopt the strategy of relief at a distance. 
Yet by constructing it in terms of deployment at ‘source’ the government could construct their 
endeavours as proactive and rational, addressing both humanitarian and security imperatives. 
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While other EU states were distracted by refugee quotas inside the EU, Britain was constructed 
as getting to the roots of the problem by supporting a “properly functioning government in 
Libya” that could tackle people trafficking (Cameron 2015f). Accused of not doing enough to 
shelter refugees, the government reasserted its shouldering ‘moral responsibility’ by 
contributing £900 million, more than any other EU state to humanitarian aid that would enable 
refugees survive in the countries around Syria (Cameron 2015f; Cameron 2015a). Military 
assistance was also given to Lebanon and Jordan in the form of the training of soldiers and the 
building of watchtowers on the borders with Syria (Cameron 2015g) capable of monitoring the 
movement of large numbers of people, troops or civilians. The interweaving of the migrant and 
terrorism discourses of risk graphically captured in the aftermath of the Paris attacks can be 
traced back to Britain’s stance in North Africa. The provision of ‘massive aid’ was not only a 
moral act of humanitarianism in Cameron’s discourses, it was also presented as serving 
minimize the “numbers making the perilous journey to Europe” (Cameron 2015f; Cameron 
2015a) so eased the pressure on borders. 
 
 
III. Ascribing criminality to the migrant 
Ascribing of criminality to the migrant, particularly those already in the EU, was a critical 
discursive technique in legitimizing the fortification of defences at Calais and in transferring 
risk and responsibility to the migrant body. As the scale of the crisis magnified, discourse 
shifted from the individual ‘stowaway’ detected by border police so presented as ‘evidence’ of 
the effectiveness of controls to the metaphoric and Cameron’s de-humanizing ‘swarm’ or 
‘marauders’ captured in Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond’s interview with journalists 
(Legrain 2015; Mortimer 2015). While the displaced person in the UN camps outside the EU 
could be categorized a ‘refugee’ and those risking their lives crossing the Mediterranean 
‘migrants’ or ‘people’ colluding with smugglers out of desperation, by the time they reached 
Calais they were presented as intent on criminal entry into Britain. Their actions were presented 
as aggressive, a violation of the nation space or concealing movement for the purposes of 
deception so suggesting a subversion of the legal and hence highlighting the threat to the UK. 
Constructing developments in Calais in these terms conjured up associations of waves of 
barbarian raiders having breached the outer defences of Europe and threatening Britain’s 
second line of defence in Calais (Cameron 2015b). Breaches of the defences were captured in 
accounts of migrants walking along railway tracks, disruptions to trains and infiltrating of 
lorries. These recurrent references conveyed the sense of constant pressure on and 
transgressions of the borders. While the refugees and displaced in the UN camps were not 
assumed to be criminal, the migrants in Calais were and the risk they posed to UK’s internal 
security also became associated with international developments and terrorism into a more 
amorphous and ever widening sense of danger. The ‘threats to our security’ had ‘grown 
enormously’ ranging from Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine on the eastern border of the EU to 
the emergence of ISIL and the migration flows triggered by the war in Syria. (Cameron 2015h). 
What emerged was a sense of the EU under siege on two fronts and the Paris attacks 
17 
materialized what might otherwise have seemed to be a distant threat, demonstrating a “direct 
and growing threat to our country” (Cameron 2015a). 
Besides criminality and threat of terrorism, the migrant was also presented as opportunistic and 
a disruptive force to the economy. The port workers strike had led to the temporary closure of 
the port and “unacceptable disruption” of traffic and trade (Cameron 2015b). The more pressing 
concern for the Cameron government was opportunistic migrants taking advantage of the 
disruption to breach the perimeter fences. Lorry drivers, tourists and local residents in South 
East England were seen as particularly vulnerable to ‘clandestines’ seeking to sneak into the 
vehicles. The British government again presented itself as acting responsibly and morally to 
mitigate the risk to legitimate traffic posed by migrants by fortifying its borders constantly. The 
nature and scale of the threat, the trespassing onto rail property and the disruption to legitimate 
traffic and trade served to legitimize measures more commonly associated with national 
security. The 'NATO fence'4  usually used to protect world leaders at summits from terrorist 
attacks was for the first time in history deployed outside UK and erected in Calais to ‘protect’ 
train platforms from migrants (Cameron 2014). Further securitization and militarization of the 
border controls sought to mitigate the risks presented by this influx of migrants and to create 
“secure” spaces in which UK-bound lorries and cars within the port could be insulated from 
“clandestine” activities (May 2015c). Freight vehicles were subjected to “intensified 
screening” using the “best techniques and technologies in the world” (May 2015a) intended to 
detect hidden bodies, otherwise invisible to the naked eye. The detailed descriptions and lists 
of border technologies deployed to detect and deter served to materialize what the government 
meant by controls: “hard” had become synonymous with militarization and securitization. 
Statistics were used to capture the supposed effectiveness of these measures (Cameron, 2016a). 
Between 21 June and 11 July, 11000 attempts were ‘successfully intercepted at juxtaposed 
ports’ in France. 
Beyond the securitization of the borders in Calais, the Mediterranean coast line became part of 
Britain’s militarized response to the migration crisis (May 2015d). Two Royal Navy ships were 
deployed to assist Frontex’s Operation Triton search and rescue operations and Border Force 
cutters, which had a long history of “patrolling and protecting our shores” that stretched back 
centuries (May 2014) were deployed to the Mediterranean to intercept smuggling. The 
government, along with those from France and Lithuania, used its position on the Security 
Council to secure UN authorisation for the EU or individual countries to seize the boats of 
smugglers with the purpose of saving lives or of victims of trafficking (HC 2015a; Cendrowicz 
2015).5 In October 2015 naval operations entered a ‘new phase’ of boarding ships and arresting 
                                                          
4The formal name of the ‘NATO fence’ is the National Barrier Asset (NBA), a collection of temporary security 
barriers established in 2004 to provide police with the ability “to protect high profile locations or temporary 
events … from vehicle borne suicide attempts’. It has been used for NATO summits and the London Olympics 
but this was the first time the 9ft high fence has been used outside the UK. It is owned by the government and 
transported around the UK whose identity is not revealed for security reasons. It has been designed so it can 
be assembled and transported easily but able to withstand the impact of 7.5 tonne vehicle travelling at 50mph 
(BBC Magazine 2015). 
5Critics labelled the more aggressive policy approach “gunboat diplomacy”, NGOs argued it would do nothing 
to stop the crisis and African states on the Security Council expressed concerns about its inclusion under 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which means it can be militarily enforced. The resolution authorizes the search 
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smugglers. Thus as the migrant crisis escalated so too did the militarization of the external 







The ‘Other’ as risk is an under-explored phenomenon in risk literature. How we manage 
cultural and spatial encroachments by the migrant ‘Other’ through policy frames and rationalist 
discourses is the primary focus of this paper. We analysed the ‘migrant’ as risk in political 
discourse through a constructionist approach between 2010 and 2016, particularly in the 
context of the migrant/refugee camps in Calais and the increased forced migration in the 
Mediterranean. Despite global interconnectivity and reconfiguration of time and space through 
technologies, the border space has been renewed as a body politic of risk. The phenomenon of 
‘Othering’ and the social production of categories in society is both ideological and political, 
retaining the migrant body as a sustained a site of anxiety and fear. Foucault’s notion of 
‘governmentality’ provides a means to order our fears and anxieties about cultural and spatial 
encroachments through rationalised risk discourses in terms of immigration policy or effective 
border control. In view of this, the spatial category of the border and the boundary become both 
productive and imaginative spaces to encode risk and uncertainty and the ‘governmentality’ of 
the nation-state in modernity. The recurrent anxiety over the migrant and the need to contain 
her in government discourses reiterate the migrant as a pregnant risk body from her 
transgression of our borders to her depletion of our economic resources. As such the ambit of 
risk management provides a means to bolster a sense of control over our borders and to equally 




Table 1: Government announcements on immigration and borders  
 *2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 *2016 TOTAL 
CALAIS 7 2 0 3 2 6 4 24 
MEDITERRANEAN 2 0 0 0 1 20 13 36 
REFUGEES OR MIGRANTS 
OR CALAIS OR 
MEDITERRANEAN 
39 35 23 44 37 49 34 261 
* 2010 is a truncated year from May to December because of the general election and 2016 is truncated from January to June 
because of the timing of this research. 
                                                          
and seizure operation for one year but stopped short of authorizing the destruction of the boats as proposed in 
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